What I've Been Reading

The Virtues of Our Vices: A Modest Defense of Gossip, Rudeness, and Other Bad Habits by Emrys Westacott.
I have been trying hard to implement Tyler Cowen's advice on the importance of reading at-least one book a year on a subject we disagree - a title like "The virtue of our vices" made it irresistible. 
Deducing Aristotelian moderation, Emrys makes a convincing case and at times he did succeed in making me uncomfortable. May be, I might not fully shed my preconceived notions on any of the vices but this book definitely will help me become more of a pragmatic than a polemic or a moralist.


"Part of my purpose, though, certainly is to shake up some of our default opinions and conventional wisdom on the issues discussed. And in doing so I hope that we can become not just more self-critical but also, paradoxically, more forgiving, both of ourselves and of others. For we live in interesting times, and this makes everyday moral life more complicated than it is in societies where the rules and the social roles are relatively fixed and not subject to critical questioning."

On Rudeness:

The perennial complaint that civility is declining while rudeness is on the rise is thus probably misplaced. The problem is not that people today are trampling underfoot the time-honored rules of polite behavior. The problem is, rather, that these rules are in flux, and there is consequently some confusion about what they are and what abiding by them signifies. Inevitably, in these circumstances, it will often happen that one person's confusion leads to another person's taking offense. But confusion and anxiety are part of the price we pay for living in a dynamic culture. Offense, too, is an unavoidable by-product of moral progress. The struggle to claim equal rights for ethnic minorities, women, and gays would never have got off the ground if people had eschewed any action likely to cause offense.

Similarly, although many people do not like to be talked about in a way that damages their public reputation, some may not mind, agreeing with Oscar Wilde that “there is only one thing in the world worse than being talked about, and that is not being talked about.”

On Gossip:

Really, what is being criticized here is shallow living—something we are continually discovering new ways to achieve. But there is no reason to suppose that engaging in gossip is at odds with the attempt to live less superficially. On the contrary, since one of the benefits gossip can bring is a deeper understanding of human nature and social institutions, it is more plausible to think that a willingness to talk about people—which at times will involve gossiping—may be an integral part of the “examined life.” This is why we find Socrates, in Platonic dialogues like the Meno and the Gorgias, freely discussing the failings of others in the course of his philosophical inquiries. A deeper reason we might have for viewing gossip as a spiritually unhealthy practice is that we conceive of the ideally good or beautiful life as one free from any trace of maliciousness, schadenfreude, or pleasure taken in someone else's failings. Moral purity of this kind is one of the hallmarks of the saint.
But achieving a better understanding of the character, motives, actions, and relationships of someone we know—whether it be an acquaintance or a public figure—is something most of us desire, as is a deeper understanding of human beings in general. And gossip is indispensable to our achieving such insight.

A healthy interest in our fellow human beings is thus, to use one of Hume's categories, a quality that is useful to both ourselves and others. Besides, all things being equal, we should be grateful for the opportunities for pleasure that life offers us, not have a bad conscience about them. Talking to people about people is one of these. To refrain from it for fear of moral corruption is a form of moral neurosis.

On Snobbery:

You can dislike certain things about yourself; and you can be unhappy about other people's noticing them. You can wish that others were more charitable in their interpretation of your actions, even that they were more susceptible to being duped by you. But holding true opinions about one's fellow human beings, while it may sometimes indicate that a person is cynical, or suspicious, or untrusting, or coldhearted, can rarely, if ever, be deemed a moral failing in itself.

Unfortunately, hypersensitivity to any hint of antiegalitarianism sometimes leads to a knee-jerk, wholesale condemnation of anything that is thought to have a snobbish tinge to it, and accusations of “elitism” start flying around. But as with blanket condemnations of gossip or rudeness, this response is too crude and takes in too much. It is a mistake to advocate never talking about others for fear of “gossiping,” or to fetishize manners to such an extent that one cannot recognize when rudeness might be acceptable. And similarly, it is a mistake to forgo expressing or arguing for our tastes, preferences, considered opinions, and values merely out of a fear that we might appear snobbish or be tempted onto some slippery slope.

Marx's critique of ideology taught us to look out for the class interests that underlie people's beliefs; and we certainly should continue to be alert to the ways elitist views may serve the interests of the socioeconomic elite. At the same time, just because a practice, a point of view, or a cultural product is favored by the elite does not mean there must necessarily be something wrong with it. It can still be enlightening, amusing, beautiful, stimulating, edifying, or true. Snobbery, as we have defined it, is objectionable; but the way to avoid it is not to eschew entirely any thought, word, or deed that might conceivably be thought snobbish. The better solution is to cultivate humility, self-awareness, and a willingness to think hard and honestly about these matters. And let's face it, the snobbery-alert patrol won't be out of work any time soon. They can expect to be gainfully employed at least until the end of the next millennium, or until we realize an egalitarian utopia—whichever comes sooner.

On Humor:

The moral dubiousness of a joke is inversely proportional to the social standing of those it targets. The more powerful the “victim,” the less likely we are to object; the more vulnerable the victim, the more questionable the humor.

One assumes that such saintly types would not find sick jokes funny. The perfectly good heart is so dripping with kindness and compassion that no spark of morally dubious humor can kindle a smile. Our own amusement reminds us of our distance from this ideal, so it is accompanied by a moment of self-criticism, experienced as guilt. Such feelings should not be ignored, but nor should they always be our guide. The saintly ideal may sometimes serve a valuable purpose, but it should not be the only or even the main benchmark against which we judge ourselves. No doubt it would be good in many ways if most of us were less callous and more humane than we are (although comedians would find it harder to make a buck). But our ethics has to be one tailored to flesh-and-blood human beings trying to get by in a complex world, not to saints.

As with gossiping or rudeness, when humor causes undeserved harm to those who are vulnerable, either directly or indirectly, that is a good reason for criticizing it. But we should not leap onto our moral high horse too quickly. Nor should we be too hard on ourselves for what we find amusing. The lines of acceptability with regard to humor, as with social etiquette, are constantly in motion. So to those who earnestly peer at everything through moral spectacles, who are instantly suspicious of anything that might cross some line of political correctness or moral probity, the message is simple—lighten up!

The default position for most of us in a modern, pluralist, liberal democracy is that we should respect other people's beliefs. Respectfulness is a virtue, and it is associated with tolerance, which everyone agrees is a good thing. To not respect someone's beliefs is generally viewed as a failing; it can be hurtful or alienating, and evinces a closed mind. But this common response is too simple. Not all beliefs are worthy of respect, and withholding respect is sometimes in order. There are different kinds of respect, and a belief may deserve some of these but not others. Already, alarm bells may be ringing in some readers’ minds, since it is often assumed that respect for a person's beliefs is inseparable from respect for him as a person; so to deny the former is to withhold the latter. But I will argue that this view is mistaken. Moreover, it supports an attitude that, in the name of respect and tolerance, sometimes condones intellectual slovenliness.

Why should I respect your opinion:

People are free to believe what they want, of course, but not every belief deserves to be taken seriously as a candidate for truth. Withholding epistemic respect at times is one of the ways we express our current intellectual values and try to advance a little further toward a more rational society.

The idea that we have an obligation not to criticize a person's beliefs is foreign to a contemporary liberal outlook. There may be specific occasions when criticizing a belief someone cherishes would be tactless, rude, or hurtful; so we can allow that there may be times when silence is the morally preferable option. But in the context of any kind of public forum where ideas are up for discussion, no one can reasonably demand that his beliefs be protected from dissent. More plausible is the principle that people's beliefs be treated with respect in the sense that they should not be ridiculed, scorned, or insulted. Here the constraint is only on the manner in which they are criticized. But although the principle sounds reasonable, it is surprisingly difficult to defend as a general rule. To be sure, we may agree that we should not cause anyone unnecessary pain, and insulting someone's cherished beliefs may do this. But sometimes the pain caused is not gratuitous but an unavoidable consequence of something that really needs to be said. Besides, we also cherish freedom of expression and the benefits it brings. The fact that some people may be offended by what is said hardly seems a strong enough reason to curtail free speech. Moreover, rhetorical freedom is an important aspect of the right to free speech. Very often, the critique of a belief is more powerful and more persuasive because of the way ridicule, irony, sarcasm, and wit are employed. Think of the contributions to important debates made by the likes of Swift, Voltaire, Hume, Paine, Nietzsche, and Mencken.